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A PSYCHO-ANALYTIC PEEK AT CONSPIRACY*
AL

KATZ**

There is... in the American temper, a feeling that "somewhere,"
"somebody" is pulling all the complicated strings to which this
j umbled world dances. In politics the labor image is "Wall Street"
or "Big Business"; while the business stereotype was the "New
Dealers."
D. Bell, The End of Ideology
140-41 (rev. ed. 1962)
I.
In these few pages I will attempt a theory of why people seem
to have a tendency to "explain" events in terms of "a conspiracy."
The theory is based on Freudian psychoanalysis, so it must be
presented here with some foreword. Though I feel psychoanalytic
insights are often useful outside of or beyond an individual therapeutic regime, one must heed Freud's warning that
it behooves us to be very careful, not to forget
that after all we are dealing only with analogies,
and that it is dangerous, not only with men but
also with concepts, to drag them out of the
region where they originated and have matured.1
I have tried to remain conscious of the analogous quality of
this enterprise throughout. If both parties to this communication
are at least partly successful in this way perhaps the theory presented will prove useful.
II.
The circumstances of the Kennedy assassination caused many
people to believe that this act of murder was the result of an
insidious and elaborate plan, a belief not altogether dissipated by
the Report of the Warren Commission. More recently a series of
* Originally prepared for discussion by the Group for Applied Psychoanalysis, State
University of New York at Buffalo.
" Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.S., Temple
University, 1963; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1966, LL.M., 1967.
1. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITs DIscoNTENTs 141 (The Int'l Psycho-Analytical Lib.
No. 17, 1930).
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suggestive circumstances and ambiguous symbols grew into widespread conviction that Paul McCartney of "The Beatles" died
several years ago and the remaining members of the group constructed an elaborate plan to conceal the fact. The United States
Government chose to prosecute Dr. Spock and four others for conspiracy even though an indictment for aiding and abetting draft
evasion was more likely to result in conviction. Apparently everybody loves a conspiracy as much as a parade. This is not to say that
conspiracies are imaginary things, but one does wonder at their
appeal in the face of often substantial contradictory evidence.
It is perhaps understandable for people to look for indications
of a conspiracy because all experience is relatively ambiguous.
There may be a simple apparent explanation for an event as well
as a complex opaque one. How does one know which is real? How
can one know what is really happening or what has actually happened? So saying, some degree of suspicion is probably justified,
but there is a point where one begins to feel that the search for
conspiracies is motivated by something deeper than the essential
ambiguity of ordinary experience. I would like to suggest a possible explanation: the disposition to find conspiratorial enemies
is a manifestation of the anxiety produced by an unconscious primal scene fantasy. (Conspiracy derives from conspirare;to breathe
together.) Freud found that many of his patients claimed to have
witnessed their parents having intercourse.2 Whether these were
reports of historical events or fantasies he did not regard as a
crucial question.3 In any event, "the scene.., is likely to produce
a 'traumatic state' by flooding the organism with an inappropriate
excitation. '

4

It is the anxiety produced by this witnessing of a

secret event that I believe accounts in part for our fascination with
and fear of conspiracies.
Those who are reluctant to accept apparent explanations of
an event will often defend their scepticism by saying something
like, "There is more to this than meets the eye." The cliche is
highly suggestive, for it applies wherever reality appears as a mask
for a very different sort of reality. For the child the apparent reality
2. 3 S.FREuD, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, in COLLEarED PAvEns 473,
509 n.1 (The Int'l Psycho-Analytical Lib. No. 9, E. Jones ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
Infantile Neurosis].
3. Id. at 534.
4. 0. FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIc THEORY OF NEUROSIS 214 (1945).
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of an asexual intraparental relationship takes on this quality of a
mask for the sexuality of the bedroom. In some quite literal sense,
from the child's point of view, there is indeed more to this (mother
-father relationship) than meets the eye.
As one might expect the phrase is over-determined. "More
to it than meets the eye" implies a hidden quality about the unrevealed reality. Parental sexuality may take place behind a closed
door or in darkness. Furthermore, the "eye" is generally the
medium through which the child imagines that he witnesses the
event. It is this sort of "spying" activity which, while necessary to
get at the truth, produces guilt to the extent one has "intruded"
into an event that was meant to be private and obscured.
Not long ago Justice Harlan stated that "every conspiracy is
by its very nature secret."' 6 This dictum has great appeal for reasons
not entirely practical. To the extent "there is more to this than
meets the eye" identifies the suspicion of a conspiracy; one that
is obvious can hardly be imagined. Justice Harlan identifies the
conventional mental imagery stimulated by the term conspiracy:
a clandestine, secret meeting under cover of darkness. If I pass a
group of men huddled together in a dark alley whispering quietly
to each other the immediate reponse may be that they are "up to
no good." In my youth the neighborhood kids would have said
something like "those guys are gonna fuck somebody," or "somebody (the victim) is going to get it in the ass" or "take it in the
shorts." These phrases are suggestive, particularly the latter two.
Freud reported that the coitus always appears to have been performed a tergo7 or more ferarum.s There is, therefore, a connection between the ambivalence of the primal scene fantasy and
our ambivalent adult response to a suggestion of conspiracy. That
is, there is clearly a mixture of fear and excitement or fascination
at the thought that a conspiracy "may be behind it all." "Thus
such an experience (the primal scene) is likely to connect the
ideas of sexual excitation and danger." 9 I think this connection
can also be seen in the dissents from the findings of the Warren
5.
6.
7.
8.

Infantile Neurosis 555.
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402 (1957).
Infantile Neurosis 534.
S. FREUD, The Paths to Symptom Formation,in THE COMPL=
TURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 369 (J. Strachey tranl. 1966).
9. 0. rENICHEL, supra note 4, at 214.
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Commission. There is an uneasy excitement in having discovered
a conspiracy to kill Kennedy which is not present if the act was
planned by a single individual.
One of the more familiar types of conspiracy is the vice ring;
the so called spy ring is perhaps equally familiar, and both entities
are often headed by someone called a ring leader. These terms
identify not only the purposes of the enterprise, but-if they are
properly used-the structure of the combination as well. "There
may be one person . . . round whom the rest revolve. The metaphor is the metaphor of the center of a circle and the circumference. There may be a conspiracy of another kind, where the
metaphor would be rather that of a chain; A communicates with
B, B with C, C with D, and so on to the end of the list of conspirators." 0
Because the ring or circle type structure facilitates the division of labor and control, combinations of any size tend to be
of this type. The following observation by Fenichel makes this
structural fact quite significant.
In psychoanalytic practice, we have the
habit of stating, when sensations of this kind
[equilibrium and space] come up, such as rotating objects, rhythmically approaching and receding objects, sensations of crescendo and decrescendo, that 'primal scene material is approaching.' But of course, sensations of this
kind are not specific for 'becoming aware of
sexual scenes in the surroundings.' They are,
rather, specific for being overwhelmed by excitation."'
There is one further suggestive phrase worth mentioning
here. We often speak of people who are admitted to an existing
conspiracy (let in on) as having been admitted to the "inner
sanctum." This is even true of presidential cabinets where, although one knows the membership, one does not know what transpires "within." The phrase "inner sanctum" is particularly good
at generating that excitement of the dark and mysterious which
10. Rex v. Meyerick, [1929] 21 Crim. App. 94, 102 (Eng. C.CA.).
11. 0. FENICHEL, supra note 4, at 215.
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accompanies the fear of discovering what lies within. If my memory
serves me, "inner sanctum" was the title of a radio mystery program with particular appeal to children. Though it is undoubtedly
overdetermined, "inner sanctum" certainly suggests an image of
that bedroom wherein the primal scene is re-enacted in fantasy.
The anxiety generated by conspiracy is reflected in specific
legal prohibitions which are justified by the particular potential
force which conspiracies may release. In other words, next to the
potential power of conspiracies individual criminality is relatively impotent. I think the latent meaning here is a fantasied
comparison between the tremendous sexual power of the parents
and the almost complete sexual impotence of the child. But discovery allows the individual to manage the anxiety in at least
two ways. Simply by "knowing" the discoverer can maintain a
degree of psychic control over the event, and what he knows can
be imaginatively recreated in fantasy and repeated in play; in
either case knowledge is a precondition to control. Furthermore,
knowledge facilitates ego satisfaction. The phrase "they tried to
put one over on us" is instructive here. Where a conspiracy succeeds one has been "had" (overcome by genital power), but when
it "comes to light" it has been "foiled" (overcome by genital
power). The power potential of the conspiracy or the sexual power
of the primal scene are to some extent neutralized by knowledge.
In a somewhat different sense, attributing a conspiracy to an
event amounts to an assertion that events do not occur without an
act of conscious, more or less rational, human will. Anxiety producing events simply do not happen but are the product of (perhaps evil) human will. It may be that this suggests a regression to
that developmental stage where children tend to regard their
parents as omnipotent with respect to the world. If something
happens the parents must have had a hand in it or at least be able
2
to do something about it.

In a recent paper John McDermott developed the thesis that
technology as an ideology has the effect of widening the cultural
and social gap between social classes. The arcane quality of the
learning, the skills and the language of technology works to exclude the lower classes from the system and the forces that affect
their lives. The management of technological society is entrusted
12.

See J. PIAGET, TuE MORAL JUDGMENT

OF THE CmLD

61, 62, 63 (1965).
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to the highly trained (upper) classes. 13 McDermott relates a story
which he uses as a parable to describe the effect of this development. The story and his application of it have direct relevance to
my concern here.
According to GI reports which the soldiers
had heard and believed, the Viet Cong had long
ago hollowed out most of the [Black Lady]
mountain in order to install a very big cannon
there. The size of the cannon was left somewhat
vague-'huge fucking

.

.

.'-but

clearly the

GI's imagined that it was in the battleship
class. In any event, this huge cannon had formerly taken a heavy toll of American aircraft
and had been made impervious to American
counterattacks by the presence of two-'huge,
fucking'-sliding steel doors, behind which it
retreated whenever the Americans attacked.
Had they seen this battleship cannon, and did
it ever fire on the camp, which was easily within
its range? No, they answered, for a brave flyer,
recognizing the effectiveness of the cannon
against his fellow pilots, had deliberately
crashed his jet into those doors one day, jamming them, and permitting the Americans to
move into the area unhindered. 4
The imagery in this story is striking: a huge fucking cannon
inside Black Lady Mountain which is impervious to attack or
observation because protected by two huge doors. But the GI's
are safe now because a "brother" flyer crashed into the doors,
though this invasion cost him his life. The manifest content of this
story barely disguises the primal scene fantasy. The power or energy contained behind the doors is an immediate threat which can
only be permanently contained at the cost of one's "life." But
even though the "flyer" loses his life, his "brothers" are free to
move into the area. The brother-flyer split allows both Oedipal
desire and castration fear to be represented.
13.

McDermott, Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals, THr NEW YORK RIEV

oF BooKs, July 31, 1969, at 25.
14. Id. at 29-30.
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McDermott explains this story by noting that the GI is
never let in on the facts regarding the actual circumstances or
position of his group. Rather, he is given specific instructions
which he is expected to follow with "blind" obedience. "Under
such circumstances, reality becomes elusive. Because the soldiers
are not permitted to deal with facts in their own ways, facts cease
to discipline their opinion. Fantasy and wild tales are the natural
outcome."' 5
McDermott seems to be on the right track; he seems to be
saying that when men are in the position of children they begin
to regress, to behave like children. Consequently they fill in the
gaps in their knowledge with fantasy. But for the purpose of understanding our fascination with conspiracy the use to which McDermott puts this story is even more interesting. He argues that "the
effect on those who are excluded from self-management" by a
technological society is similar to the effect of ignorance on GI's.1
"Soldiers in Vietnam are not alone in believing huge, secret guns
threaten them from various points; that same feeling is a national
17
malady in the U. S."'
The essential and general point is that relative powerlessness
in terms of knowledge and understanding of what is going on at
the centers of decision-making tends to produce a disposition
toward a "conspiracy" response. I think this point can be made
particularly dear in the Spock case. It is still a matter of some
speculation as to why the government chose to prosecute the
"Boston Five" for conspiracy rather than for simple aiding and
abetting. The case for the latter was strong but quite weak for the
former. But if the purpose, or at least one purpose, of the prosecution was widespread publicity about the trial the conspiracy theory
is much more useful. What I am suggesting is that in an almost
instinctual way the government realized that everybody does indeed "love" a conspiracy, at least enough to pay some attention to
it, and that they are much more afraid of what is "behind" a conspiracy than they are of the harmfulness of aiding and abetting
criminal activity. The instinctual appeal of conspiracy means that
if people are given any suggestion that a conspiracy exists their
psychological matrix of expectations shifts the burden of proof to
15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 32.
17. Id.
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the extent of creating in their own minds a presumption in favor
of the reality of such a conspiracy. In other words, people seem
more ready to believe an allegation of conspiracy ("there is more
to this than meets the eye") than they are to accept apparent explanations.
Quite apart from the effect of this presumption on the outcome of actual litigation, it has significant political and social consequences. By employing the rhetoric of plot or conspiracy, any
group (and I am not necessarily claiming this as a conscious tactic)
can generate substantial apprehension, and use the anxiety thus
generated to support policy decisions which might otherwise not
stand up against rational argument.
In this respect I would call attention to two alleged conspiracies which had tremendous social and political consequences.
As a basis for passing the Communist Control Act of 1954 into
law, Congress had to find the existence of an "international communist conspiracy" directed from the Soviet Union. This finding
identified American communists as "foreign agents" and conspirators, rather than people potentially dangerous because of their
adherence to a hostile ideology. Finding a heretofore "hidden"
conspiracy ("behind the iron curtain") intensified the danger in
the popular imagination and diminished potential conflicts with
the first amendment and traditional notions of criminal responsibility.1 8 Furthermore, the finding of conspiracy shifted the burden
of proof not only in a psychological sense but, in at least one respect, in a legal sense as well. 9
No one needs to be reminded of the tremendous utility the
allegation of a Jewish conspiracy had to the Third Reich. This is
certainly an extreme instance and I would hesitate to apply the
thesis of this essay to it as an essential explanation either of the
genesis of the claim or the force of its appeal. But the general point
retains clear significance: as a device to direct social consciousness,
pointing to the power of a hidden, insidious conspiracy has tremendous utility for the reasons I have described.
I should hasten to point out that the government has no
monopoly on appeals to primal scene fantasy. Anti-establishment
ideology increases its appeal in direct proportion to its use of con18. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 (1961).
19. See id.
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spiracy rhetoric. "Ruling Class," "Power Elite," "Military-Industrial Complex," "Intellectual Mandarins," and "Crisis Managers" are all phrases that imply subtle "connections" with the
power to overcome the impotent masses (lower class, workers,
students, are all substitute terms for psychosocial purposes). Note,
for example, that the law does not prohibit all steel manufacturers
from charging the same prices for their products. It only prohibits
them from agreeing to do so. The radical attack on modern capitalism mirrors the establishment's attack on dissent by charging that
the companies do in fact agree to set prices but do so in subtle,
fundamental ways: the power of the corporate giants derives from
the conspiracy of self-interest in maintaining its own supremacy.
McDermott hypothesized that an increasingly technological
society means a widening cultural gap between social classes, between the managers and the managed. Those below the managerial
elite would come to understand less and less about the decision
making process and consequently have less control over it.20 The
implications of McDermott's hypothesis for some future species of
"red-hunting" and a broader use of the rhetoric of conspiracy in
political discourse are frightening to say the least.
III.
It has been suggested to me in discussion that the Conspiracyas-Primal Scene theory set forth above fails to distinguish conspiracy from other types of deception such as fraud, counterfeiting
and so forth, and also fails to explain why conspiracy proneness is
not better accounted for by a theory having its roots in repressed
homosexuality. I will attempt to remedy these defects in turn.
These are several clear legal distinctions between conspiracy
and other forms of deception. First off, conspiracy requires at least
two parties; other forms of illegal deception may or may not be
engaged in by more than a single actor. In addition, the crucial
operative legal factor in conspiracy is the agreement; in other
forms of illegal deception it is the illegal action which is the crucial
factor. Certainly in these other cases if there is joint action conspiracy could also be charged, but this is a matter of prosecutorial
20. McDermott, supra note 13, at 25, 31-32.
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choice. In any event, in law it is the agreement between two or
more persons which is the focus of concern.
These legal distinctions provide a clue to the psychological
difference between one's responses to and perception of conspiracy
and other forms of deception. The possibility that one may be
deceived by any other individual is, of course, always present. In
general, it seems that people feel competent to cope with this
possibility, which is the possibility "of being had." I would suggest
that excessive concern with "being had," being deceived, is indeed
rooted in repressed homosexuality, but is quite different from the
anxiety generated by the possibility that "there is more to this than
meets the eye."
I think the confusion lies in the failure to make the following
types of distinctions. In its aggravated form, concern with deception becomes a persecution delusion of the sort Freud dealt with
in Schreber's case.2 1 In its aggravated form, concern with conspiracy takes the form of an anxiety neurosis of the sort Freud
dealt with in the "Wolf Man" case. 2 The two are quite different.
The tendency to suspect that conspiracies are behind events
cannot be explained as a consequence of repressed homosexuality
to the extent this theory relies on Freud's examination of Schreber's case. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the word
conspiracy appears only in a single sentence in the account, and
even here it is Schreber who uses it, not Freud: "In this way a
conspiracy against me was brought to a head.

' 23

From the context

I think it certain that Schreber is using the word only very loosely,
so that he is not in fact referring to his perception of a concerted
agreement to do something to him. Schreber is expressing his fear
that while he is under Dr. Flechsig's care in an institution he will
be "handed over to a certain person . . .with a view to sexual

abuse." While this certainly implies that more than one person
will do the handing over, it is also clear that these individuals are
mere hirelings. The abusive operation will be done by Flechsig;
21. 3 S. FREUD, Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon An Autobiological Account of a Case
of Paranoia(Dementia Paranoides),in CoLi.EcT
PAI'ERs 387 (The Int'l Psycho-Analytical
Lib. No. 9, E. Jones ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Psycho-Analytical Notes].
22. Infantile Neurosis 473.
23. Psycho-Analytical Notes 427.
24. Id. (Freud's emphasis).
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there is no other named or otherwise identified primary figure in
the scheme.25
There is, however, a more important distinction between this
case and the conspiracy situations to which I have been referring
in this paper. It is crucial to notice that in Schreber's case not only
is the source of the threat, in the main, a single individual, but the
threat in a particular and immediate form is addressed directly
and almost exclusively at Schreber personally. This is true even
though both the source of the threat and its object "decompose"
at a later point in the history of Schreber's illness. In other words,
Schreber himself, and only he, is being persecuted. If one compares
this to the anxiety neurosis discussed in the "Wolf Man" case, one
can see clearly the distinction. In the former we are dealing with
an immediate personal fear stemming from a perception of persecution; in the latter we are dealing with a sense of acute anxiety
stimulated by representational figures-such as pictures of a wolf.
Apart from these significant differences in symptom formation
there are real differences in the genesis of the disorder. In Schreber's case Freud notes that the persecutor is almost certainly a
figure representing someone who was formerly loved.2 6 In the
"Wolf Man" case the disturbance has something to do with the
management of ambivalent feelings toward a loved individual, but
are traced in particular to real or fantasied events which overwhelm the disturbed individual. This difference is parallel to
one aspect of the distinction between conspiracy and other forms
of deception I have been urging here. The notion of conspiracy is
useful in "explaining" the anxiety one feels toward otherwise
ambiguous events (e.g., the Kennedy assassination and campus dis.
ruptions) which are unlikely, however, to cause one to fear for
one's personal safety or security. The notion of persecution, on the
other hand, is only useful in "explaining" the fear one feels for
one's personal safety and security. In the former instance, the "explanation" goes to the genesis, cause or force behind the event; in
the latter instance the "explanation" goes to the object or purpose
of another individual's behavior (e.g., fraud). The occasions for
these two "explanations" and the form they assume are quite distinct.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 424.
27. Infantile Neurosis 480-521.
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I cannot here attempt a detailed defense of the conspiracy-as,
primal scene thesis on the basis of these two single papers by
Freud other than to suggest, again, that the thesis is stated in terms
of an analogy, and that a detailed comparison of the "Wolf Man"
case with Schreber's case shows that the two are quite different.
The tendency to "explain" events by attributing them to a conspiracy is better understood in terms of the primal scene fantasy
rather than repressed homosexuality.

IV.
I would like to make one further observation which points
in a somewhat different direction. In a recent paper I suggested
that the legislative choice respecting the kinds of behavior which
should be discouraged by the criminal law ought to be guided by
the different responses people have to actions which are feared and
those actions which simply generate anxiety: only actions which
provoke fear should be proscribed by the criminal law. 28 I argued
there that this difference had a great deal to do with the proximity
of the threat in time and space, and in turn the objective-as opposed to conceptual-quality of the threat.29
In dealing with conspiracies as threats to collective security,
I conceded that conspiracies are properly proscribed because they
are feared; conspiracies do not simply generate anxiety.30 Insofar
as this would appear to be inconsistent with the thesis of this paper
I want to point out that such is not the case. It is true that real or
supposed persecutions are feared because they are specifically directed at the individual and the threat is perceived as proximate.
It is also true that ambiguous events in the world whether or not
"explained" by a conspiracy theory, tend to generate anxiety for
the reasons I have attempted to identify here. The point is, however, that as conspiracies take on a more objective quality in the
mind of the perceiver, as the relation between the conspiracy and
the perceiver becomes more proximate, anxiety is readily displaced
28. Katz, Dangerousness: A Theoretical Reconstruction of The Criminal Law, 19
BuFFALo L. REv. 1 passim (1969).

29. Id. at 24-25.
80. Id.
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by fear. Thus, in the earlier paper, I was able to defend making
certain conspiracies criminal only on the condition that the "clear
and present danger" test is retained.31 In sum, I believe the discussion of conspiracy in my former paper is consistent with the conspiracy-as-primal scene thesis presented here.
31. Id. at 25-26.

